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SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
Nowadays, Safety-critical computers are extensively 
used in may civil domains like transportation including 
railways, avionics and automotive. We noticed that in design 
of some previous works, some critical safety design 
parameters like failure diagnostic coverage (DC) or common 
cause failure (CCF) ratio have not been seriously taken into 
account. Moreover, in some cases safety has not been 
compared with standard safety levels (IEC-61508 SIL1-SIL4) 
or even have not met them.  Most often, it is not very clear 
that which part of the system is the Achilles’ heel and how 
design can be improved to reach standard safety levels. 
Motivated by such design ambiguities, we aim to study the 
effect of various design parameters on safety in some 
prevalent safety configurations: 1oo2 and 2oo3. 1oo1 is also 
used as a reference. By employing Markov modeling, 
sensitivity of safety to each of the following critical design 
parameters is analyzed: failure rate of processing element, 
failure diagnostics coverage, common cause failures and 
repair rates. This study gives a deeper sense regarding 
influence of variation in design parameters over safety. 
Consequently, to meet appropriate safety integrity level, 
instead of improving some system parts blindly, it will be 
possible to make an informed decision on more relevant 
parameters. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, safety-critical computers are obligatory 
constituent of many electronic systems that deal with human 
life safety. Several areas of transportation industry like 
railways, avionics and automotive increasingly use such 
systems. In this domain, safe microcontrollers with limited 
processing capabilities are available in the market for mostly 
control purposes. However, as systems become more and 
more complex and versatile, having safe processors with 
intensive processing capabilities becomes an essential need. 
Although there are not any generic safe processors that can 
potentially answer this eminent need, a computing platform 
can be architected safety in mind. To design a computer for 
safety-critical applications, industrial safety levels (e.g. 
European safety standard: IEC 61508, Table 1), must be 
achieved through improvement in numerous aspects of a 
general system.  
Table 1: Safety levels according to IEC 61508 standard for 
high demand/continuous systems (PFH: probability of 
dangerous failure per hour, SIL: Safety Integrity Level). 
10  ≤ PFH of SIL4 < 10  
10  ≤ PFH of SIL3 < 10  
10  ≤ PFH of SIL2 < 10  
10  ≤ PFH of SIL1 < 10  
 
Reliability of electronic components is the most obvious 
factor needed to be satisfied for building a robust system. 
Besides, clever system design by means of available electronic 
components is as important as the quality of components. 
Even with reliable and robust parts, safety goals may not be 
achieved without safety aware design process. 
Prevalent design issues like perfect printed circuit board, 
EMC/EMI, isolation, power circuitry, fail rates of equipment 
etc., are examples of common quality considerations. 
However, in critical systems, in addition to these, some other 
less obvious issues have to be observed. The ratio of Common 
Cause Failures (CCFs), meaning the ratio of concurrent failure 
rate over total failure rate, has great impact on safety. The 
percentage of failures the system is able to detect by means of 
fault detection techniques has also a direct effect on safety. 
This is because undetected failures are potential dangers. A 
usually ignored factor is the frequency and the quality of 
system maintenance. How often and how comprehensive the 
system is tested (automatically or by technical personnel) to 
repair or replace the impaired components, can guarantee the 
safety by removing transient failures or refreshing worn-out 
parts. 
As safety is a very wide subject, the main objective of this 
paper is to investigate the sensitivity of system safety to some 
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crucial design parameters. Three widespread configurations; 
1oo1, 1oo2 and 2oo3; with known parameter values, are 
assumed as base systems. For these systems, it will be 
illustrated that how adjustment of any individual parameter, 
can contribute to safety promotion of base systems.  
This paper is organized as follows: In Section II, some of 
the recent works are reviewed and our motivation is 
expressed. In Section III, definition and modeling for 
considered design parameters are described. In section IV, 
base systems and their Markov modeling are proposed. In 
Section V, simulation results are discussed, and finally 
conclusion is given in Section VI. 
2  RELATED WORKS AND MOTIVATION 
During design, concentrating on multiple aspects of 
design altogether for the purpose of improvement can be a 
complicated and difficult task. Normally, if the prototype 
design does not meet the requirements, it is rational to find the 
system’s bottleneck and focus on it. In safety-related designs, 
by knowing the share each parameter provides to safety, the 
designer can decide where to put more effort to improve the 
outcome. 
In [3], two dual-duplex and TMR synchronous systems 
are built using MIL-SPEC electronic parts. The effect of CCFs 
are not assessed there, and the effect of diagnostic coverage is 
not assessed for TMR system. Besides, the achieved safety 
level is not compared to standard levels. In microcontroller-
based SIL4 software voter [1], SIL4 level is claimed to be 
obtained. Nevertheless, neither failure coverage nor CCFs are 
assessed in sufficient details. In safe computer for a train [4], 
not only is the safety level not compared to standard levels, 
but neither CCFs nor diagnostic coverage is discussed.  
In the above projects, a lack of consideration of some the 
critical safety parameters or lack of comparison the system 
safety with standard safety assessment levels makes them 
incomplete to be considered for real safety-critical 
applications. This stimulated us to have an analysis over a few 
safety architectures also used in above works. By showing the 
sensitivity of safety to each of the ignored parameters, we 
hope to inform our readers. This can help practitioners to 
select most appropriate parameter to be improved to achieve 
safety goal. Depending on the project constraints, the most 
appropriate parameter can be translated to the one that leads to 
cheapest, fastest or easiest system modification. 
3  SYSTEM’S SAFETY PARAMETERS 
In this section, we review the definition and modeling of 
main parameters that we want to investigate their effect on 
safety. 
3.1 Processing Element Failure Rate 
A safety-critical computer system is composed of one or 
more redundant processing elements (PEs, also called 
channels), connected to each other by communication links. 
Generally, there is no extraordinary requirement regarding 
reliability of PEs. It means a PE is a regular processing 
module, built from available Commercial-Off-The-Shelf 
(COTS) electronic parts including microprocessor, memory, 
power circuitry, etc. Components are not necessarily the kind 
that are specifically designed for reliability purpose. In this 
study, overall, we take a PE as a black box and assume a 
single failure rate λ  or simply λ for it. 
3.2 Common Cause Failure (CCF) 
According to IEC 61508-4 standard [7], Common Cause 
Failure (CCF, or dependent failure) is defined as concurrent 
occurrence of failures in multiple channels caused by one or 
more events leading to system failure. The β factor represents 
the fraction of dangerous failures that is due to CCF. 
Typically for a duplicated system β value is around a few 
percent. In safety standards, two β values are defined for 
detected and undetected failures (β 	and	β), while here we 
take a single β value for both. By using the extended β 
modeling and notations from [5], below formulations are 
supposed to be valid for all systems in this work: 
 The 1oo1 configuration: There are no redundant PE, then 
0. 
 The 1oo2 configuration: As depicted in Figure 1, the  of 
system is only related to CCFs between two PEs. Then 
. 
 The 2oo3 configuration: As depicted in Figure 1, the 
overall  of 2oo3 system is related to mutual CCFs plus 
CCFs shared among three PEs. Note that by definition of 
, CCF ratio between every two PEs is taken as  
(0.3 0.7 ). According to modeling proposed in 
[5], for a typical 2oo3 system, in total 2.4 . 
 
 
Figure 1:  model for duplicated and triplicated  systems [5]. 
3.3 Failure Diagnostics Coverage 
According to IEC 61508-4 [7], Diagnostic Coverage 
(DC) is defined as fraction of dangerous failures detected by 
automatic online test. Here we assume that failures are 
detected by two complementary techniques, self-testing and 
by comparison. Self-testing routines run upon each PE to 
diagnose occasional failures autonomously. Usually self-
testing detects absolute majority of failures, around 90%. 
Second diagnostic technique is data comparison among 
redundant PEs to detect rest of failures. Then generally we 
have: 
1              (1) 
Borrowing the formulations and notations from [2], the 
following terms are hypothesized to describe the system’s DC 
rate. According to the referred formulation, the total DC is 
reformulated as: 
1 . 														 2  
The  is the efficiency of comparison testing. Since the 
comparison method is more effective against independent 
failures (none-CCFs), it is sensible to differentiate between 
DC rate of CCF and independent failures. Therefore, two 
variants of former formula are [2]: 
1 . 	            (3) 
1 . 																					(4) 
Here  and  are two constants, 0 , 1, describing 
the efficiency of comparison for either of two classes of 
failures. Since comparison is less effective against CCFs, the 
 value is normally low, for example less than 0.4, while  
can be close to one [2]. 
3.4 Test and Repair Rate 
According to IEC 61508, for all systems, two forms of 
test (and repair) are available: proof test and online test. Their 
rates are denoted by  and  respectively. The  is the 
frequency of periodic system maintenance by technicians. 
 (mean time to restoration) is defined as 1/ , the 
time interval at which a thorough system check is performed. 
During proof test, any undetected failures (not detected by 
online diagnostics) are detected and faulty parts are repaired 
or replaced then. Typically,  is from a few weeks to 
a few years.  
Online (or automatic) testing is the second form of testing 
whereby test routines run on each channel periodically. In 
some situations, as soon as online test routine detects a failure, 
system is supervised to go into fail-safe mode to avoid 
dangerous output. After that, system tries to resolve the failure 
with immediate call for personnel intervention or even without 
it by doing a self commanded restart. For transient failures, a 
system restart can be a fast solution, while for persistent 
failures switching to a backup system provides a fast system 
recovery. In any case, online repair is supposed to last from a 
few minutes to a few days.  
4 BASE SYSTEMS  
4.1 Assumptions 
In this study we make the following assumptions. All 
channels (PEs) are asynchronous and identical (homogenous). 
Channels are connected to each other by in-system links, 
whereby software voting and comparison mechanisms work 
(Figure 2). In this work, our focus is on processing elements 
(PEs). I/O ports and communication links are assumed to be 
black-channel, by which safety is not effected. This 
assumption can be realized by obeying standards of safe 
communication over unsafe mediums (see EN-50159). The 
system is a continuous/high demand safety system, meaning it 
continuously runs safety functions. Specifically, the safety 
function of the system is to detect and prevent to outcome any 
erroneous calculation on PEs. 
4.2 Default Parameters 
For all parameters which we intend to investigate, we 
assign some default values to define a default base system for 
every configuration (Table 2). After that, in the simulation 
phase we sweep each parameter around default value and 
illustrate how the system safety changes. In this way the 
sensitivity of system safety, with respect to that parameter and 
around its default value is revealed. 
 
 
Figure 2: Architecture of triplicated and duplicated systems. 





 PE failure rate 1.0E-05 /hour 
self test 
Diagnostics coverage of self-
testing [2] 0.90 
 
Comparison efficiency for 
independent failures  [2] 
0.90 
 Comparison efficiency for CCFs  [2] 0.40 
 CCF ratio between each two PEs 0.02 
 Online repair rate 1 /hour 
 Proof test and repair rate 
0.00001 
/hour  
( ≈ 1 per 
year) 
4.3 Markov Models 
In this section, the behavior of all safety systems are 
modeled by Markov chain. Calculations of RAMS 
(Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety) 
measures are according to guidelines suggested in ISA-
TR84.00.02[8], IEC 61165[9] and [6]. States are divided into 
up (operational) and down (none-operational) states. In up 
states the system is able to correctly run safety functions. Up 
state is either all-OK initial state or any state with tolerable 
failures. Down states are those in which system is not able to 
correctly run safety functions, either intentionally as in the 
fail-safe state(s) or unintentionally as in unsafe (hazardous) 
state.  
As far as it is detected, a dangerous failure may either be 
tolerated (like first detected failure in 2oo3 system) or the 
system goes to fail-safe state. On the other hand, if the failure 
is left undetected, system may inadvertently tolerate it (like 
first undetected failure in 1oo2 or 2oo3 systems) or go to 
unsafe state.  
PFH (probability of dangerous failure per hour) is 
defined as rate of entering into an unsafe state. For 
calculation, repairs from down states toward up states are 
removed, as in the reliability calculation. However, from total 
failure rate , only the hazardous part λ , should be 
considered.  The required formulation for decomposing λ into 
λ  and λ  is proposed in [11] (P : Probability of being in 
hazardous state, P : Probability of being in fail-safe state, 
P P P ) : 
λ 	 .                              (5) 
Transition of Markov over time is described below: 
∙                         (6) 
where  is vector of state probabilities,  is number of 
Markov states and  is transition matrix. Abbreviations used 

















Figure 3: hazardous and safe failure rate. 
Table 3: IEC 61508 standard abbreviations 
D Dangerous failure 
DD Dangerous detected failure 
DU Dangerous undetected failure 
CCF Common cause failure (dependent failure) 
DC Diagnostic coverage 
 
1oo1 Configuration: Single system has no CCF, so all 
failures are independent. If failure is detected, next state is 












operational none-operational  
Figure 4: Markov model of 1oo1 system. 
Transition terms for 1oo1 system are 
0, : 
1 1 	  
1 1 1 	  
1 1 	 1 1 	 1 1  




1 1 0 	
 
1oo2 Configuration: According to IEC 61508-6, 1oo2 
system consists of two parallel channels which can both run 
the safety function. One dangerous-failure free channel is 
sufficient to provide system safety. Single DU failure is 
tolerable (hardware fault tolerance =1), but no DD is 
tolerated. 1oo2 system has high safety against DU failures 
and low availability against safe failures (Figure 5). 
Transition terms for 1oo2 system are: 
1 2 	2 1 . 1  
1 2 1 .  
1 2 1 2 1 2 2. . 1 	
					 .  
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2	
					 1 2 1 2 




1 1 0 0
1 2 0 0 0
0 1 2 0 0
























Figure 5: Markov model of 1oo2 system. 
2oo3 Configuration: Similar to 1oo2, 2oo3 is a safe 
configuration and is capable of tolerating one DU failure 
(hardware fault tolerance=1). However, it has also high 
availability due to being able to tolerate single DD failure, 
similar to 2oo2 system (Figure 6). 2oo3 has benefits of both 
1oo2 and 2oo2 (2oo2 is not described here). Due to more 
vulnerable channels (since the vulnerability of the system 
increases with the increasing number of channels), 2oo3 is 








































Figure 6: Markov model of 2oo3 system. 
Transition terms for 2oo3 system are: 
2 3 	3. 1 . 1 1.7  
2 3 1 2.4  
2 3 2 3 2 3 3. . 1 1.7 	
				 	2.4  
2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3	
				 2 3 2003 
Transition matrix for illustrated Markov is as follows: 
	
	
2 3 0 0
2 3
2 2
	 0 0 0
2 3 0
1 2
	 0 0 0
0 2 2 1 2 1 1 0 0 0
0 2 2 0 1 1 0 0
2 3 0 1 2 0 0 0
2 3 2 2 1 2 1 1 0 0
 
5 SIMULATION RESULTS 
In this section, we show the effect of variation in each of 
aforementioned parameters around defined default value, 
over system safety (PFH). SIL1-SIL4 safety levels are plotted 
by horizontal lines to show relative safety position. 
Mathematically, the following simulations show the partial 
derivations, / , where p is any of individual safety 
parameters. In initial point 1oo1 system has marginally 
achieved SIL2, while both 1oo2 and 2oo3 are in SIL3 region. 
As expected and explained before, generally 1oo2 is a safer 
configuration than 2oo3 (but 2oo3 is better at availability). 
5.1 Parameter :  
Figure 7 shows how safety is affected by processing 
element’s failure rate.  represents equivalent failure rate 
of whole PE, including all of internal components like 
processor, memory, power units, etc. The linear logarithmic 
plots with slope of one (m=1) describes a linear function, 
meaning: ∙ . Linearity implies that by just 
knowing the line slope and a single ,  point, 
without solving complicated Markov model every time, 
system safety can be tuned. It is obvious both from formula 
and figure that an order of magnitude 10  change in  
results in one safety level shift.  
 
 
Figure 7: Effect of   variation over safety. 
5.2 Parameter :  
 is the indicator of isolation among channels. Figure 8 
depicts how safety is affected by	 . 1oo1 system is obviously 
indifferent to . An observation here is how  does not 
influence the relative superiority of 1oo2 and 2oo3 systems.  
It is a well-known fact that CCF is a bottleneck of safety-
critical systems and it strongly affects safety. It is observable 
in the figure that for current parameter values it is extremely 
difficult to get SIL4 through  improvement. Because by 
questionnaire  estimation method in IEC 61508-6,  can 
hardly be estimated below 0.01. 
 
 
Figure 8: Effect of  variation over safety. 
Similar to	 , plots are linear in logy-logx plane with 
slope of one (m=1). This describes a linear function in y-x 
plane, meaning ∙ . Actually, this conclusion is 
only valid when  is not very closed to zero, seemingly for 
0.001. The only argument behind this linearity is 
dominance of CCFs over safety. Linearity makes tuning of 




Figure 9: Effect of self test variation over safety. 
5.3 Parameter self test:  
According to formulas in section III.C, self-testing is 
assumed to be equally effective for both CCFs and none-
CCFs. Hence, what is shown in Figure 9 is understandable, 
where the variation of this parameter does not affect the 
superiority of systems over each other. In 1oo2 system, for 
achieving SIL4 the self test has to be increased 1-2%, while 
for 2oo3 it is more difficult, where 6-7% of improvement is 
required (default of self test = 0.9). 
 
 
Figure 10: Effect of  variation over safety. 
 
Figure 11: Effect of  variation over safety. 
5.4 Parameter : 
ki is a constant which specifies the efficiency of 
comparison among PEs for detecting independent failures. 
Comparison is expected to be very efficient against none-
CCFs (obviously in 1oo1 =0).  
In Figure 10, there is a weird observation stating that  
has almost no sensible (very small) influence on safety of 
1oo2 and 2oo3 systems. One explanation for this finding, is 
the absolute dominance of CCFs in both systems. More 
precisely, any CCF immediately brings both systems into 
unsafe state. However, two consecutive undetected 
independent failures have to occur to cause same situation 
which is far less probable. This is translated to one order of 
magnitude less influence of independent failures rather than 
CCFs over safety. As a result, both systems seems to be 
rather insensitive to . 
One possible incorrect conclusion from this observation 
is to give up comparison for independent failures. But the 
fallacy is the point that whether a failure is dependent or not 
is not decidable at runtime. As we will see,  still has 
considerable effect on safety. Therefore, comparison cannot 
be ignored. Still a beneficial conclusion can be taken by some 
modification to previous one. As we will see,  is usually as 
low as 0.1-0.4. Therefore, if a relaxed comparison mechanism 
leads to  value as low as , it is completely acceptable. 
Because it is enough to just have a logical value for .  
5.5 Parameter :  
kc is a constant which specifies the efficiency of 
comparison among PEs for detecting CCFs. By definition of 
CCFs, comparison is not expected to be very efficient against 
them (again, obviously in 1oo1 = 0). Since in both 1oo2 
and 2oo3, CCFs are by far more influential than none-CCFS 
(because one none-CCF is tolerable in both), then improving 
 has a sensible effect over safety. 
5.6 Parameter : 
Fast repair which is invoked after online failure detection 
is either employed when system is in fail-safe state or while a 
detected failure is being tolerated (like in 2oo3, provided that 
partial-repair is available). Effect of repair rate in earlier case 
is obviously zero (remember repairs from down states toward 
up states are removed in PFH calculation). In later case (only 
in 2oo3), because the repair does not reduce the number of 
undetected failures, the effect is negligible. In practice, this 
parameter is for adjusting availability. 
 
 
Figure 12: Effect of fast (online) repair rate variation over 
safety. 
 
Figure 13: Effect of proof-test rate variation over safety. 
5.7 Parameter : 
Proof test and repair occurs periodically in long time 
intervals to remove undetected failures. It is either employed 
when system is in unsafe state or while an undetected failure 
is being tolerated (in both 1oo2 and 2oo3). Its effect in earlier 
case is obviously zero. Similar to online testing, repairs from 
down states are removed. In later case, although number of 
undetected failures are reduced, but due to dominance of CCF 
rate, such improvement is not sensed in term of safety. 
6 CONCLUSION 
In this work, we analyzed the sensitivity of system safety 
to design parameters in two basic multi-channel safe 
configurations, 1oo2 and 2oo3. 1oo1 system is also held as 
reference. All systems have been modeled by Markov chain. 
By this analysis, we aimed to clarify that in a specific design, 
at which point of SIL safety level the safe configuration 
supports. Hence it will be clear that how the current safety 
level differs from the desired safety level (SIL levels) by 
every individual safety parameter. By knowing this, instead 
of blindly improving an unsafe system, designers can make 
an informed decision to select the most appropriate parameter 
to improve. By simulation we showed there is a linear 
relation between safety (PFH) and two parameters:	  
and	 , where the later linearity expresses the dominance of 
CCF over system safety. Moreover, we concluded that only 
the parameters which have any effect on CCF rate, are 
appropriate candidates to enhance safety level. These include 
, , self test	and	 . On the other hand, 	  (efficiency of 
comparison in detecting independent failures) and both types 
of repair (online and proof test) have no sensible effect on 
system safety level. 
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